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CAROLL R. DAUGHmTy*
I should like first to summarize the main administrative and
wage policies that the National War Labor Board put into effect
during World War II and then try to draw some conclusions that
I think might have some application to the present circumstances.
The War Labor Board was set up in January 1942, after war
was declared, as an agency for settling labor disputes. It was not
until October 1942, that the Board was given the task of admin-
istering a wage stabilization program that applied not only to dis-
pute cases, where management and labor could not agree on what
wage rates should be paid or on what wage increases should be
given, but also to the cases where both wanted agreed-on wage-
rate increases.
Any wage stabilization program has to take account of the
economic, political, and other conditions that exist at the time
it is devised. In 1942 the labor movement was sharply divided.
There was bitter rivalry among various labor leaders and between
the two great federations. Moreover, management-labor relations
had not progressed to a point of maturity in general. These con-
ditions raised obstacles to the success of the wage stabilization
program. The CIO would promise wage increases and the AFL
would promise higher wage increases, or vice versa, in their efforts
to attract the allegiance of the large groups of unorganized workers.
It is also worth remembering that in the early days of the
defense program there were seven or eight million unemployed
workers, whereas we are now as close to full employment as one
can reasonably imagine the economy ever getting.
It should also be borne in mind that the controls over the
prices of many foods, the most important item in workers' budget,
were inadequate or non-existent. In other words, farmers were
in a preferred position in the whole program of price-wage control.
This fact helped to make labor somewhat less than enthusiastic
about the wage-rate control program. It meant that the wage
stabilization fight would have to consist in large part of a slow,
delaying action -a retreat from line to line.
The chief administrative policies that the Board put into ef-
fect, once it was given the job of complete wage control, were as
follows:
First, the Board said that all employers with eight or fewer
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employees did not have to come to it for approval of any wage
rate increases they might wish to grant. I think that this was a
wise decision because, manifestly, with hundreds of thousands,
even millions of small employers in this country, it would have
been an impossible administrative task adequately to appraise the
wage applications of all of them. So the Board merely expressed
the pious hope that the small employers would conform to the
principles of wage stabilization. In certain industries like the
restaurant industry, some small employers caused the Board a lot
of grief, because, being free to raise wage rates without much ex-
cept their consciences to guide them, they were able to attract
labor away from the larger employers who had to get approval
of wage rate increases. But on the whole I think it was a wise
administrative decision.
In the second place, the Board had to decide whether to try
to stabilize wage rates on a local area basis or by industries. Many
of you may not be aware that this was a serious issue during the
early months of the Board's existence. The choice, after consider-
able debate, was mainly in favor of area control As a result it
was decided that the administration of the program would have
to be decentralized. From the point of view of getting the feel of
grass root sentiment of the country, expeditious settlement of cases,
and adequate wage control, this was certainly a wise step. Twelve
regional war labor boards were set up. However, there were cre-
ated, in addition some half-dozen industry commissions to admin-
ister the wage programs for particular industries, such as trucking,
shipbuilding, and others. The reasons for establishing these com-
missions included the following: special problems peculiar to the
industry, such as shipping; the inter-state character of the labor
market and product market, as in trucking; and perhaps political
necessity. Some of the wage stabilization work done by the in-
dustry commissions was acceptable. In other cases it was often
unstabilizing to the area efforts of the regional boards.
Third, it was also decided that merit or automatic length-of-
service wage rate increases for individual employees would not
require specific Board approval. Imagine how swamped the Board
would have been if it had had to pass on every case of a wage rate
increase for a particular employee based on his individual merit.
Accordingly certain general orders were issued prescribing the
amount and frequency of such increases.
The wage rate policy that was promulgated in November 1942,
had several aspects. In general it was designed to allow laggards
to catch up with those who had already obtained sizable wage rate
increases before the controls were instituted. There were, to be
sure, certain social welfare elements in the program. Among these
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were the provision for wage rate increases for substandard wage
-workers, that is workers getting below 30 or 40 cents an hour, and
the fact that increases generally were granted in cents per hour
rather than as percentage adjustments, thereby narrowing the dif-
ferentials between skilled and unskilled workers and giving the
larger percentage of increase to the unskilled worker. But in the
main the program of the Board was designed to allow those em-
ployes who up to the time of the wage control program had not
obtained increases or only small ones to catch up with those who
had obtained large ones. That was the purpose of the Little Steel
formula. It permitted all employees to have an increase of 15 per-
cent above their wage rates as of January 1, 1941. If any group
of employees had not received 15 percent of their average hourly
earnings as of that date, they got the difference; or they were
granted the full 15 percent if they had received nothing at all.
This was the wage line to be held in terms of general, across-the-
board wage rate increases.
By May 1942, about two-thirds of the employees of the country
had already obtained 15 percent or more, some much more, of
their January 1941, earnings, leaving one-third to catch up.
Some seventy percent of the cases that came to the War Labor
Board were those involving allegations of interplant inequities.
That is to say, in a given locality, workers in certain plants claimed,
or their employers claimed on their behalf, that workers in other
plants were getting more for the same work in the same industry
or in comparable jobs in other industries.
The War Labor Board's original position on this kind of case
was set forth in the Chrysler decision. The Chrysler employees
were getting less than the Ford or General Motors employees and
asked the Board to bring them up to the latters' level. The Board
found that historically the Chrysler workers had always gotten
less and it refused to disturb the historical differential, especially
since it appeared that the differential had not widened but had
remained as it always had been.
This principle of deciding cases on interplant inequities was
enunciated as part of the program for stabilizing all wage rates.
However, the program was not administered as originally enun-
ciated. What happened was that an employer, or an employer and
a union jointly, came to the Board with figures showing that cer-
tain competitors were paying higher wage rates for the jobs in
question.
Obviously the Board could not accept without some question-
ing data that were presumably presented in order to win a case.
It had to ask the Bureau of Labor Statistics to make a wage survey
to discover what rates were being paid by the various competitors.
[Vol. 12
WAGE STABILIZATION STANDARDS
That soon became an impossible task for the Bureau, which just
did not have the manpower. So, having no data as a basis for say-
ing 'no', the Board had no alternative but to say 'yes.' Inevitably
in saying 'yes', it created more inequities than it settled.
So by early 1943 it became evident that this main part of the
Board's wage policy was becoming not only unadministrable but
also very unstabilizing. Huge backlogs of cases were piling up in
the regional offices. And the general level of wage rates was being
effectively whipsawed upward. Accordingly, the director of eco-
nomic stabilization, Jimmy Byrnes, ordered the Board to stop
granting any wage rate increases based on interplant inequities.
This was contained in Executive Order No. 9328 of April 1943.
The whipsawing that had been going on had been very profit-
able for employers and unions alike, and they were stricken by
this executive order. So the Board devised what it thought would
be an acceptable substitute. The substitute was approved by Mr.
Byrnes possibly because it was what he had in mind from the be-
ginning. It is to be doubted that he ever really intended to shut
off entirely the settling of interplant inequities.
The new scheme, the so-called "bracket" system, drew a line
beyond which such wage rate increases would not be given. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics was authorized to collect wage rate
data for key jobs in the major industries of the various local labor
market areas. From these data it would be possible to determine
what the weighted average or modal rates were for the key occu-
pations. If the applicant employees' wage rates in a given case
were more than a certain amount below this weighted average or
modal figure, they were allowed increases. Otherwise, the appli-
cations were denied except in "rare and unusual cases" involving
special war production. Incidentally, the term "rare and unusual"
was not a loophole and was not abused. There are only one hun-
dred or so cases in the Board's bracket program in which increases
were granted under this exception.
However, the pressure for wage rate increases continued to
rise. The validity of the cost-of-living index, which was the basis
of the Little Steel adjustments, was questioned. One device the
unions emplayed for getting wage rate increases was the claim
of intraplant inequities and the use of job evaluation plans to raise
the whole level of wage rates in a plant. There were good labor-
relations reasons for redress of real intra-plant inequities. But
the Board eventually had to issue rules regarding the amount of
net increase in job rates that were permissible under job-evalua-
tion plans. Another method of obtaining wage concessions was to
ask for shift premium pay, paid vacations, and other items which
my friend, Lew Gill, labeled "fringe". Here the practice prevailing
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in the area was supposed to determine the acceptability of appli-
cations.
The War Labor Board's wage-control program included re-
straints on permissible wage-rate increases under wage incentive
plans. It also handled the problem of providing wage-rate struc-
tures for newly built war plants; it provided that the job rates in
such plants should be set at the weighted average or at the mode
of the rates being paid for similar jobs in the locality.
In brief this is the story of the War Labor Board's wage sta-
bilization activities. To summarize, there was mainly the Little
Steel formula; there were the interplant inequities which consti-
tuted the bulk of the Board's cases; there were the intraplant in-
equity cases; and there were the adjustments for substandard wage
earners. Hundreds of thousands of cases were processed. In retro-
spect, I think that the wage line was held pretty well, considering
the pressure, the number of employees involved, the economic-
political conditions of the time, and our lack of previous experience.
It is obvious that the War Labor Board played pretty much by ear.
The earlier experience of the public members of the Board had
been largely in meditation and arbitration. They were used to tak-
ing cases on their merit as they arose and they were disinclined to
work out in advance a wage stabilization program.
Now to the second main part of my discussion: In listing the
lessons to be learned from the War Labor Board experience, I
offer the following: In the first place, in formulating policies for
the emergency that faces us today, it is necessary to take into
consideration, just as the War Labor Board did, the degree of
maturity in the labor movement and the degree of responsibility
that labor can assume. Bear in mind that during World War HI
England had no War Labor Board; the unions voluntarily imposed
disciplines on themselves. American unionism and labor-manage-
ment relations are still some distance from those in Britain. But
there can be little doubt that our labor movement is less disunited,
better organized, and more mature than in 1942. And there has
also been marked improvement in union-employer relations. These
facts should be among those making for the second of any current
wage-control program.
Second, the success of the program depends a great deal on
the existence of an emergency and of a feeling of urgency. Wage
controls would be much more comfortably borne after an atomic
bomb had been dropped on Chicago or Detroit. The extent to which
all of us, including employers and unions, feel the sense of urgency
will be a major determinant of the extent to which we cooperate
with a control program. I note no great sense of urgency among
American workers or other groups today.
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Third, a control program, like any government regulation must
have three characteristics. It must make economic sense and have
economic validity. It must make political sense and be politically
acceptable and feasible. And it must be administerable, that it,
reducible to manageable proportions.
In this connection I raise the question as to whether the pres-
ent control program should provide for the rectifying of interplant
inequities. It has always been a fact that there are a great variety
of rates paid by employers in the community. There will always
be the low-wage employer who gets along and makes profits by
virtue of paying low wages in spite of getting poor labor in return
for such wages. Then there is always the employer who pays very
high wages and gets the cream of the labor market and keeps
competitive because he has the best labor by reason of paying high
rates. In between there are the mass of employers. Furthermore,
organized labor has made marked progress in removing both inter-
plant and intraplant inequities. If these things are so, that I should
advocate handling interplant inequities only as a measure for eas-
ing the sting of what may be considered the basic inequities of
the whole wage-price stabilization program. I shall refer to these
in a moment.
Fourth, I think the War Labor Board was wise in eliminating
the very small employer from consideration in devising rules for
granting individual increases without prior approval as well as
in general decentralizing administration as much as possible. These
steps help to reduce the job to manageable dimensions.
Fifth, although it makes for some administrative inefficiency,
the control program should be administered tripartitely in policy
matters. In a state of war the government becomes at least semi-
authoritarian, which strikes at the heart of collective bargaining at
the plant level. If management and labor are not permitted to
work out free settlements under the control program, a very seri-
ous blow is struck at harmonious labor-management relations.
There should at least be some collective bargaining at the top level,
that is, in the regional and national war labor boards. It is the
remainder of collective bargaining that can exist during a period
of emergency.
Sixth, experience showed that wage rates cannot be used as
a means of moving manpower from place to place. This has to be
the job of a war manpower commission or similar body. We quickly
learned, for example, that in a community where there are 100,000
jobs and 80,000 people you cannot supply the shortage of 20,000
people by raising wage rates first in this plant, and then in all the
others because you have created inequities by your first decision.
All you have done is to increase labor turnover and raise the whole
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level of wage rates. And you still haven't relieved the shortage.
The only way to do this is to increase efficiency, lengthen work
periods, and get women, young people, old people, and other groups
not normally in the labor market to go to work.
Seventh, any wage-control program must, I think, permit
workers, organized or unorganized, who have lagged behind the
others to catch up in the matter of increases since some proper
base date. A major inequity would exist if all existing wage rates
were frozen as of some current date. The problem is to hold the
pacemakers in check, not to prevent the laggards from catching
up. The Stabilization Board has wisely issued its present-day ver-
sion of World War II's Little Steel formula.
Finally, there is another point that deserves the utmost em-
phasis, both for economic and human-relations reasons. Wage rate
control is inextricably related to price control. You cannot have
any workable wage rate control without price control because
when the cost of living rises, you have unrest, you have demands
for wage rate increases, the very thing you want to get rid of. So
the control of the cost of living is absolutely essential to successful
wage rate control. And it is just as true that in order to make
price control successful you have to have adequate wage rate con-
trol because wage cost is usually a major part of total cost. An
increase in either product prices or wage rates keeps us on the
merry-go-round of inflation or produces serious economic distor-
tions and keen senses of injustice.
This fact brings up for our consideration one of the major fruits
of collective bargaining since the war, a fruit of the rankly spread-
ing tree of inflation. I refer of course to the successful efforts of
unions to protect themselves against the depreciation of the buy-
ing power of their money wage rates, either through the formal
escalator clauses or through contractual provisions for frequent
reopening on wage rates. Should the wage board declare such
provisions null for the duration of the emergency?
My answer to this question is "no", provided that certain other
actions are taken by government. These actions would include the
control of virtually all important product prices, including those
of farm products and house space, and the imposition of adequate
taxes on profits in excess of those needed for the maintenance and
expansion of productive facilities and for the payment of normal
dividends. It is repugnant to my conception of the public interest
and it offends my sense of social equity for any group to be especial-
ly favored at a time when the country as a whole must make size-
able sacrifices as we prepare to defend ourselves against the threat
to our way of life. I feel very strongly that these sacrifices should
be fairly shared by all groups.
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If we were to have adequate price controls, then, there would
be no need to nullify the escalator wage clauses of labor contracts.
Adequate price control would almost automatically mean adequate
wage-rate control. The most important wage stabilizers would then
be the price stabilizers. And there would be no interference with
an important achievement of free collective bargaining.
The wage-control program could then consist mainly of (1)
a Little Steel formula of general wage-rate adjustments for the
laggards, which would cover fringe as well as straight wage-rate
adjustments; (2) provisions for individual intra-plant adjustments,
subject to specific rather than general limitations; and (3) pro-
visions for changes in incentive wage systems and for new-plant
wage structures, both similar to those used by the War Labor Board
during the war.
